

struction; so in death, which means that things become a recollection for God, man does not cease to live an active life and to know himself as being thus active. We are brought to a perfectly similar result as is supplied by this argument "from spirit," by the argument "from body," which is the analogical inference from the fact that our own body at once reflects and carries within it a spirit. Analogy does not point to the conclusion that God has a body such as we have, but certainly to the conclusion that He stands to the universe which has been posited by Him, in a relation similar to that in which our spirit stands to our body. While the argument from spirit teaches us to maintain as seriously meant sayings of Christ which people laud as being the most profound of His sayings and yet forget, this belief allows us to be more just to Paganism than most Christians can be. The further Psycho-physics, only the beginnings of which as yet exist, are developed, the more victorious this theory will prove itself. But even as it is, it can be shown that a psychology which assigns as the seat of the soul one definite point, must lead us to a God who is also only a point; while a more correct science of Psycho-physics teaches us to recognise truth in the doctrines alike of mystics and rationalists, of Christians and pagans. Throughout the whole work there runs, moreover, the complaint, that the doctrine which is demanded by analogy and recognised by Christianity, namely, of the existence of spirits which stand between God and man, has been narrowed down by modern Christians to the mediatorship of Christ alone, and by Catholics too, who, when they are men of culture, allow to angels and saints an existence only on canvas. The idea that an angel watches over us, bears us at death to heaven, is not only poetically beautiful, but is literally true. The spirit which animates the earth is an angel; and the body of which he is the soul is a (heavenly) body, which moves about in heaven.—The years which have passed away since these last words were written have, in spite of new difficulty with his eyes, occasioned no pause in Fechner's activity as an author. Besides, the fact that this activity has been directed to very varied departments of knowledge has served to bring always into clearer relief the unity and rigid connection of thought which characterize his theory of the universe. We may mention here, first, the work entitled, *Some Ideas on the History of the Creation and Development of Organisms* (Leips.,

1873), in which he clears away from the theory of descent a number of the one-sided elements and difficulties under which it labours, as held by Darwinians. One of the principal points here, is the distinction drawn between organic and inorganic matter, not from a chemical but a mechanical point of view, since Fechner holds, that in the former the particles of the molecules which act upon each other alter the order in which they are arranged, while in the latter they preserve it. In the formula for the relative position of these particles, therefore, the symbols are reversed in the former case, while in the latter they are not, *i.e.*, in the former, we have periodical and other developed movements, while in the latter we have only very small vibrations in relatively stable positions of equilibrium. The various phenomena that can occur, in which inorganic, or organic, or finally, organic and inorganic molecules come into near contact, are taken up in order; and all organisms are shown to belong to a mixed system which consists of both. To these definitions, given in Section i., there is to be added as a second cardinal point (III.) the introduction of a law which has been discovered partly *a priori*, but partly through experience, and which Fechner is inclined to place beside the principle of the conservation of energy, under the name of "the principle of the tendency to stability." According to this law, there is in every system, when left to itself, or when existing under constant external conditions, a continuous progress from unstable to stable conditions, until a final condition is reached which, if it is not absolutely stable, is perfectly or approximately stable. Seeing that the conditions of stability are much more favourable in the case of the inorganic molecules and systems than in those of the organic, this principle (iv.), when applied to organic relations, renders it possible easily to explain the transitions from the organic to the inorganic, which are known to experience and undeniable, while the inorganic state can produce no organisms out of itself. Just for this reason, exactly like the *generatio æquivoca*, so too the modern theory of descent, according to which in primeval time the organic is supposed to have come out of the inorganic, ought to be exchanged for the more correct view (v.), that the inorganic masses were first separated from the masses existing in the originally organic condition of the earth; or, to put it otherwise, that the molecular organic and molecular inorganic sprang from the cosmorganic con-

dition of primitive matter by means of differentiation. (It is shown, besides, how this hypothesis is compatible with the cosmogony of Kant and Laplace, since it allows us to place the impulse to tangential divergence from the falling line in the molecules of the planets, etc.) In Section vi., Fechner turns to the consideration of what is the only really original theory of Darwin, namely, the struggle for existence; and he shows how this struggle has in the present no such importance as is possessed *e.g.* by the inter-dependence of the conditions of existence of organic creatures; and how, further, for this and for other reasons, that principle is to be applied only as a complement of others, particularly of the one just referred to, which is designated as the principle of relational differentiation, and the sway of which we everywhere recognise, whenever what is homogeneous splits up into correlates that are mutually complementary. Like this principle, so too that of decreasing variability (vii.) has been too much neglected by the modern theory of descent, although it would necessarily have led to this very theory. This is still more true of the principle of the tendency to stability. In Sections viii. and ix. the question is further developed as to what form the theory of the universe will take, and as to how we are to think of the origin of single organisms and particularly of man, when, all these principles are taken into consideration, and when, in accordance with them, we see in the animal and vegetable protoplasm, not matter in its original form, as many moderns do, but rather the residuum which,—after the uniform primitive creature, that is, the primitive organism, had differentiated itself,—remained over as something incapable of further differentiation. Section x., on “Some Geological Hypotheses and Palæontological Fancies,” then follows. In all three sections, it is shown that, in contra-distinction to the view that the higher creatures have sprung from the lower, we may hold as equally thinkable the view, that the lower creatures are, on the contrary, secondary products which have split off in the way of differentiation. In the two last sections the results of the investigation are brought into connection with the views Fechner had developed in his other works. Thus, in the eleventh section we have it stated, that the tendency to stability can be very easily thought of as the basis of a psychical tendency which, when it steps across the threshold of consciousness, proceeds in the

direction of a contemplated end, so that in this way the principle which has been established can be turned to account psycho-physically and teleologically. Finally (xii.), the proofs are brought forward under the form of theories of belief, which establish the fact that, just as molecular organic beings may be subjects of consciousness, so too may the cosmorganic One; and that scientific confidence in the principle of the tendency to stability quite naturally forms the basis of the religious confidence that God guides everything for the best. "If one is surprised, however, that the *Zend-Avesta* and the *Elements of Psycho-Physics* should have come from the same man, it is a surprise of the same sort as when we see how branch and root have come from the same seed and are found united to form the same plant."—After writing this work, Fechner directed his energies as an author to a department in which a reader of his works would have expected to find him, even had he not known that he had long laboured there in his professorial capacity,—the department, namely, of æsthetics. In the works, *On Experimental Æsthetics* (first volume, Leips., Hirzel), and *Elements of Æsthetics*, which appeared in two volumes (Leips., 1876), he does not try to deduce æsthetics "from above" by placing a metaphysic of the Beautiful at the top, but to build it up "from below" by considering the cases in which sensuous perception gives rise to pleasure directly, and not only after reflection. He then goes on to investigate the laws or principles according to which this takes place, and the object accordingly comes to be called *beautiful*. (Although the conception of the [truly] beautiful involves that of the morally valuable, still the main thing is so much the exciting of pleasure, that Fechner willingly calls his standpoint, eudæmonism.) Of the principles which have been discovered, the two first are closely connected with the Psycho-physics, since, according to the "principle of the threshold," the sensation must pass across the threshold of consciousness in order really to give pleasure, and must be near it in order to give pleasure easily; and according to the "principle of help or intensification," the combination of conditions of pleasure can produce pleasure of a higher value than is produced by the sum of separate conditions of pleasure. With these two quantitative principles are connected as qualitative principles, the three chief formal principles, of uniform connection of the manifold, of truth, and of clearness.

Finally, alongside of these five principles, Fechner places as a secondary principle,—though not on that account a less important one,—that of æsthetic association, according to which that gives us pleasure which reminds us of what is pleasant—a principle upon which hangs, if not the whole of æsthetics, as in the case of Lotze, then, at any rate, the half of it. None of the principles, accordingly, are so fully treated of as this. After the separate principles have been taken up, the rigid connection which marks the previous part of the investigations falls somewhat into the background. The headings of the separate sections, which follow, may serve to show this, and at the same time to prepare the reader of the book for the instances of instructive and stimulating thoughts which await him. x. Explanation of the impression made by a landscape by means of the principle of association. xi. The relation between poetry and painting from the point of view of the principle of association. xii. Impressions of physiognomy and instructive impressions. xiii. A defence of the direct factor in æsthetic impressions, as opposed to the associative factor. xiv. The various attempts to establish a fundamental form of beauty. Experimental æsthetics. Golden section and quadrat. xv. Relation between conformity to design and beauty. xvi. Commentary on some maxims of Schnaase in matters of architecture. xvii. Of ingenious and witty comparisons. xviii. Of Taste (second volume). xix. Art from the point of view of its conception. xx. Remarks on the analysis and criticism of works of art. xxi. On the conflict between those who hold to form in æsthetics and those who hold to matter, in relation to the plastic arts. xxii. On the question how far art may depart from nature. Idealistic and Realistic tendencies. xxiii. Beauty and characteristics. xxiv. On some of the main departures of art from nature. xxv. Preliminary considerations to the three following sections. xxvi. to xxviii. On style, Idealizing, Symbolizing. xxix. Commentary on a maxim of K. Rahl's. xxx. On the strife for superiority between art and nature. xxxi. Beauty and art from the point of view of fancy. xxxii. On the idea of sublimity. xxxiii. On the greatness of works of art. xxxiv. On the question of coloured sculpture and architecture. xxxv. A contribution to the æsthetic theory of colours. xxxvi. Preliminary remarks to a second series of æsthetic laws or principles. xxxvii. Principle of the contrast of conse-

quence and reconciliation. xxxviii. Principles of summing up (practice, etc.). xxxix. Principles of persistence and change of occupation. xl. Principle of the expression of pleasure and pain. xli. Principle of the secondary idea of pleasure and pain. xlii. Principle of the æsthetic mean. xliii. Principle of the economic application of means. xliv. Supplementary section on the relations of measure as governed by law applying to pictures in galleries. Supplement to Part 1: On the colour impression of the vowels.—The last work of Fechner's which has appeared up to the present time, bears the title, *In the Cause of Psycho-Physics* (Leips., 1877). In it he first recalls those laws and formulæ which he has established, then collects all the objections which have been brought against them, and next reviews the reasons with which his opponents have supported their objections. The result he arrives at is, that they agree still less with each other than they do with him, and so he closes with these words: "The Tower of Babel was not finished, because the workers were not able to understand how they were to build it; my psycho-physical structure must remain standing, because the workers will not be able to come to an understanding as to how they should tear it down."—Whoever, after this description, might be inclined to think it strange that Fechner should have been introduced here, and not in § 345 among the innovators,—to whom certainly a man belongs, whose *celcrum* is quite express to the effect that it is necessary to break with all previous philosophy,—should in that case not think of Berkeley and Kant's doctrines about nature, nor of Schelling's animated stars, so much as of what Fechner himself says in the preface to the *Atomic Theory* . . . "how I, who have fallen away so far from Schelling, and simply here show this in a clear light, yet originally fell with my whole philosophy from his stem; how I plucked the best fruit from what was certainly a widely deflected branch of Hegel (Billroth?); how I got from Herbart's ashes,—though I miss and regret in them stem and fruit,—a coal to burn upon my hearth." Besides, how would it have been possible for one whose scientific intercourse consists of disputing, even when he came victorious out of the dispute, not to have borne some traces of the fact that he had placed himself so often at the standpoint of others?

11. To Fechner's panentheism (cf. § 327, 2), so full of

souls, the theory of the universe advanced by his younger countryman, RUDOLPH HERMANN LOTZE, presents a diametrical contrast, as he has himself quite rightly observed. Born on the 21st of May, 1817, in Bautzen, he came to the University in the year 1834, and studied medicine for four years; besides which he studied philosophy with such good effect, that he was able in the year 1839 to qualify as *Docent* in both faculties. In his medical studies he found in Volkman, with whom he was personally very intimate, a true adviser; and he found the same in Weisse as regards his philosophical studies. When *Docent* in Leipsic, he published his *Metaphysics* (Leipsic, 1841). This was followed by the book which justly gained for him a great reputation, the *General Pathology and Therapeutics as Mechanical Sciences* (Leipsic, 1842), in consequence of which he became extraordinary professor in Leipsic. The article entitled "Life" in Wagner's *Handwörterbuch der Physiologie*, belongs to this period. Since 1844, he has been ordinary professor in Göttingen. While the *Logic*, which was published while he was still in Leipsic, is connected rather with the *Metaphysics*, the *General Physiology of the Bodily Life* (Leipsic, 1851) and the *Medical Psychology, or Physiology of the Soul* (Leipsic, 1852), are to be regarded as continuations of the *Pathology*. A couple of æsthetic treatises by him had appeared previously: *On the Conception of Beauty* (1846), and *On the Conditions of Beauty in Art* (1848). His entire theory of the universe, however, is given in the *Microcosmus: Ideas for a History of Nature and a History of Humanity* (3 vols., Leipsic, 1856-64, 2nd ed., 1869; a third edition has also appeared); and during the time in which he was engaged on this, there also appeared the first portion of the *Controversial Writings* (Leipsic, 1857), which consisted of a reply to Fichte. It was perhaps the fact that Lotze in the third part of his *Metaphysics* described sensations as self-assertions of the soul when disturbed, which, in spite of the circumstance that in this book he carries on a constant polemic against Herbart, gave occasion to its author being classed with the Herbartian school. This perhaps also explains how he continued to be so classed even after he had published his criticism of Herbart's *Ontology* in Fichte's *Zeitschrift*. The result was, that in the work which he wrote in reply to Fichte, he distinctly forbade this, and stated, with as much frankness as correctness, his position in reference

to other standpoints. According to his own account here, it was a strong inclination to poetry and art which first brought him to study philosophy. He was thus besides led more in the direction of the great circle of ideas, which, owing to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, had been developed, speaking generally, rather into a characteristic mode of culture than into a finished system of doctrine. He mentions as the influence which told most decidedly of all upon him, that of Weisse, to whom he was indebted for having become so thoroughly acquainted with a certain circle of ideas, and for having become so strongly convinced of the truth of them, that he has never had any occasion outside of himself, and has never felt any inclination within himself, to give them up again. The study of medicine brought him to see the necessity of acquiring a knowledge of natural science, and it at the same time enabled him to see the completely untenable nature of Hegelian views. It is to this knowledge, to physics, in short, and not to the preponderating influences of the philosophy of Herbart, that he owes his realism, his theory of simple essences, and his perception of the truth that causality occurs only where there is a plurality of causes, etc. If any philosopher at all were to be named as having shown him the way to the position he occupies, then it would have to be Leibnitz with his world of monads, for he did far more for him in this respect than Herbart, for whom he has in fact an antipathy which he cannot overcome. We can hardly err, if, as among those convictions which at an early period became immovably fixed in Lotze's mind, or even as being their culminating point, we take the theory of the universe which Lotze in the same controversial work gives as his fundamental theory, and which is allied to that of the elder Fichte. According to it, the sufficient ground of what goes to make up all being and existence is to be found in the Idea of the Good; or, to put it otherwise, the world of moral values is at the same time the key to the world of forms. Only, he does not wish, with the elder Fichte, to restrict the Idea of the Good to the domain of action, but, on the contrary, according to him, the calm bliss which belongs to the Beautiful, the holiness which attaches to the passionless and inactive moods of the mind, are equally a part of that ideal world which ought to be, and to which the whole haste of action is related only as the means whereby it is to be realized. Just on this account this



theory of the universe is sometimes called the ideal, sometimes the ethical, and sometimes the æsthetic theory. In accordance with this fundamental theory, he is able in his *Metaphysics* to describe his standpoint as teleological idealism, and to say that metaphysics does not find its starting-point in itself, but rather in ethics. This work, which Lotze's later works have caused people to forget more than ought to have been the case, starts investigations into the truly existent, which are necessary, he says, because as culture takes different forms and goes on advancing, what at first passed with men as the truly existent loses its significance as such, and gives place to something else. The investigations are divided into three parts, the *first* of which comprises the doctrine of being, or ontology. After having discussed the conception of being, and then that of essence, he passes on to treat of the connection of things (through their relation to an end); and as the result of the investigation, he declares that that only is truly real which ought to be. The three main conceptions which are brought out here are, those of ground, cause, and end. To these he holds that the standpoints of Spinoza (Hegel), of Herbart, and of the philosophy of nature correspond, and that the defect of these standpoints consists in the one-sidedness with which those who severally occupy them take up only one of these conceptions and neglect or deny the other two. By far the most difficult part of Lotze's *Metaphysics* is the *second*, which treats of the phenomenal. Here, as he constantly does afterwards, Lotze warns us not to forget that appearance not only demands a substance which appears, but also something to which it appears; so that thus the forms of the phenomenal or the cosmological forms are nothing else than the means by which the ontological forms, and finally therefore whatever can be regarded as an end, can come to be perceptible. They are accordingly objective appearances, without which the connection of things or the teleological process cannot be made perceptible. Since these forms, which correspond to the three ontological fundamental conceptions, are partly pure, *i.e.* mathematical, partly reflected, *i.e.* empirical, and partly transcendental, a mathematical, an empirical, and a speculative philosophy of nature are conceivable. The general conception of time, from which time is got by abstraction, spatiality, and motion, are pure forms of perceptibility. Matter and force, in a physical sense, are

reflected forms. They are illusions, which are produced in certain configurations of the phenomenal; but they are besides abbreviations which the physicist has a right to use. Among the transcendental forms of perceptibility, mechanism, or the system of all mechanical processes, occupies a foremost place, as comprising all the rest. In this connection, it ought to be noticed that Lotze here makes no distinction between mechanism and chemism, but that by the first expression he understands all causal connection in accordance with law, so that to mechanism he opposes nothing but teleological connection. Already at this point he declares, in fact, that he is opposed to the separation of the mechanical and the organic, and insists that all organic processes should be explained mechanically, and that a physical physiology should be established. It would certainly be difficult to explain in this way the beginning or first disposition of things, for, respecting this, all knowledge comes to an end; but when once an organism has come into existence, then everything goes on within it mechanically, *i.e.* in accordance with physical law. The last question of cosmology, as to how that essence must necessarily be constituted which changes the objective externality and its influence into an inner definite form of existence, namely, sensation, paves the way for passing to the *third* part of the *Metaphysics*, which treats of the truth of cognition. First of all, the subjectivity of the categories is discussed, then the passing over of the object into the categories, and finally the deduction of the categories. The main point here is that Lotze is opposed to making the ordinary dualistic separation between real existence and the recognition of it in knowledge his starting-point; for if we begin with this, the result we naturally arrive at is, that the world is in reality quite different from what it is as known, and so we are thrown into doubt as to whether we are justified in subordinating the real to the categories which exist in us as a possibility of knowledge. On the contrary, the process of cognition is itself a part of actual existence, and it is only when the vibrations of ether are changed into colours by the seeing subject that we have the complete reality. Accordingly, the investigation into what our perceiving soul contributes to the excitations which move it, *i.e.* a critique of reason, does not require to precede metaphysics, but is a part of it. Since the so-called objects form only the one part of reality, they should be placed under

the categories; just as, on the other hand, the same relation lies at the basis of our way of perceiving existence, as lies at the basis of existence itself. Just as the final ground from which we can explain why causes (*causæ* and *concausæ*, according to the older form of metaphysics) concur and produce an effect, is to be found in the end involved in the latter, so too the final ground from which we can explain the fact that the knowing subject meets the existence which is known, as, for instance, the seeing eye meets the vibrations of ether, is to be found in the highest end of all and in him who sets it before himself; and the supreme problem of speculation would undoubtedly only then be solved when everything were represented as the realization of divine ends, or deduced from the Absolute. The modern idealism of Schelling and Hegel attempted this. That the attempt miscarried, is perhaps to be explained by the fact that it is an attempt beyond the reach of human power. It can certainly, however, be explained, when we remember that they despised mechanism to such an extent—and by mechanism is meant the immanent reign of law in the reciprocal relations of things, by means of which all existence is made possible—as at last to maintain the truth of what was physically impossible, because it appeared ideally desirable. The investigation of that connection between things which is governed by law belongs, according to Lotze's repeated assertion, to the subordinate side of philosophical inquiry. In fact, in the controversial work which he wrote in reply to Fichte, he even goes the length of saying that it is the opposite of philosophical inquiry, and in accordance with this, describes as non-philosophical those writings in which he had made it his aim to consider the phenomena of body and soul from a purely mechanical point of view, that is to say, in which he tries to find out how far the physical and chemical laws which are known to us go in the direction of explaining the phenomena of healthy and diseased life, without having recourse to a life-force which is different from them, or to a higher power which works in accordance with ends. He is unjust to these works; for not only, as he rightly boasts, has he had a lasting influence on physiologists, but also psychologists have felt that they have made essential advance in their subject by their help. The works referred to are: the *Pathology*, the treatise on *Life and Life-Force*, the *Physiology*, and the *Medical Psychology*.

12. In the *General Pathology and Therapeutics*, which we take up first, Lotze seeks to carry out the theory that what takes place in the living body is distinguished from what goes on in inanimate physical existence, not by any fundamental difference in the nature and way of working of the acting forces, but by the arrangement of the points of attack which are offered to these forces, and upon which, as is the case everywhere in the world, the form of the final result depends. This is worked out in the *first* book, the general nosology, in such a way as to show that by life-force we are not to understand any force in particular, but rather, on the contrary, the intensity of the effect which results from the union of many partial forces under certain conditions. If it is intended that this effect should maintain itself, then any change is a disturbance of it. Disease is this disturbance, if, owing to it, the existence of the organism is endangered, the existence, that is, of a system of masses closely connected with each other, which offer such definite points of attack, that a previously arranged series of developments must follow from them. The *second* book contains the symptomatology, and discusses in detail the diseased sensations and motions, the deflections of circulation, the diseased conditions of the nerves and the soul, the deflections of nutritive secretion and assimilation, as well as of excretion. The *third* book, the general ætiology, treats of the liability of the body to illness, the influences of external physical conditions, and finally contagion. If by a sceptic we understand, as we ought to do, not one who is inclined to denial, but one who cares for thorough investigation, then the opinion which was expressed by many, and particularly by practical men, on the appearance of Lotze's *Pathology*, that the author was a sceptic, would have to be extended to all his writings. Just as he unsettles the idea of the doctors in reference to the old-fashioned notion of crisis, etc., so in exactly the same way he points out to the physiologists and psychologists how many links in their chains of reasoning are still wanting, and how many possibilities have not yet been excluded from their arguments, in order that he may bring them to confess that there is a great deal which has not yet been sufficiently considered. Perhaps the fact that dogma retires so much into the background in his investigations is the reason why a man with whom as regards intellectual grasp Weisse alone among German philosophers can be com-

pared, and who now therefore stands alone so far as this quality is concerned, with whom as regards acuteness in discernment George only can dispute the palm, and who is besides far superior to both as a brilliant writer and lecturer, has not founded a school, either among his readers, or among those who have attended his lectures. It is possible that he has too much of the academic spirit, and too little of the professor about him, for this. With the *Pathology* is connected the *General Physiology of Bodily Life*. When Lotze wrote this book, he had had experience of the fact that his *Pathology* and his treatise on *Life-force* had been employed by many, in order to make it appear as if science had reached the point at which it was prepared to explain all the phenomena of life as physical and chemical processes of a perfectly simple kind. One of the tasks which he sets himself in this work is to combat this arrogant delusion. In the *first* book, in which the fundamental conceptions and fundamental principles of general physiology are discussed, he first expresses his views in regard to the different ways of conceiving of nature. These are reduced to the ideal, dynamic, and mechanical theories; and in this connection he reaches the conclusion that true science admits that there is a justification for all three, provided that the first—to which the teleological way of looking at things belongs, in addition to the view according to which everything is deduced from the Absolute—does not stop short with the idea of the realization of the end apart from means, nor set up as an end what is not really realized by means of the active causes, and provided that the second does not entirely exclude the third. In the comparisons between the living and what is without life which follow this, Lotze declares against all the distinctions, hitherto held as valid, which it is usual to make between the two. Still, in the last section, which treats of the essence and conception of life, it is pointed out that we are justified in making a distinction between the living and what is without life. The organism is compared to a machine which has been constructed by art, and it is shown how one of the main differences is to be found in the fact, that in the case of our machines it is almost exclusively the mechanical laws of motion which are turned to account, but not, along with these, the chemical transformation of the separate parts of the machine. The *second* book treats of the mechanism of life, and the economy of living bodies. The

chemism of the change of elements is taken up first. In this connection, the teleological presupposition that the organism is intended by its nature to preserve itself is firmly maintained throughout; and it is proved that the method followed in the change of elements is that of uniform avoidance, by means of which the body, instead of directly defending itself, secures itself against any disturbing of its elements. Change of elements is, accordingly, organized decay, in which the body maintains itself just as the form of a vortex does. A full discussion of the chemical side of the change of elements in animals and plants follows; and in connection with this, attention is called particularly to the circumstance that here the walls of the retorts are not, as in our laboratories, made of glass, which is without feeling of what is going on, but consist of membranes. After the chemism of the change of elements has been considered, Lotze goes on to treat of the mechanism of this change; and in particular deals with molecular effects, the movement of sap in plants, the mechanics of the first and second ways, and also of assimilation and secretion; and then, thirdly, he speaks of the mechanics of the formation of structures. This is done, for the most part, in the sceptical spirit characterized above. In opposition to the loose comparisons made with crystallization, and to the measurements, which are often entirely without any principle, special emphasis is laid upon those points to which a morphology of the future must pay particular attention. The fourth chapter treats of the functions of living bodies, and takes up, first, the dynamics of their motions; next, their mechanism, and further treats of the functions of the nerves; and, finally, of their susceptibility to stimulus. Habit, in general, is discussed here; and, as had been already done in the *Pathology*, the distinction between habit and custom is done away with by reducing the latter to the former, by reducing the blunting, say, of a sense to the exercise of it. The fifth and last chapter of the second book treats of the combination of physiological processes, and discusses waste and repair of elements, the conservation of heat, the economy of forces, regulation by means of the central organs, and periods of life. This is followed in the *third* book by a discussion of the kingdom of living existences, and of how they are preserved. In the first chapter, which treats of the system of organic creatures, the general conception of natural kingdoms, the distinction between plants and animals,

the graduated series of living existences, and types of organization, are all discussed. Lotze's tendency to oppose hasty dogmatising comes out here in quite a special way. The distinction between plants and animals is one which, in his opinion, can hardly be maintained. The views expressed by Fechner in his *Nanna*, if not actually confirmed, are at any rate described as irrefutable. It is in connection with single classes at most that we can speak of a graduated series, and certainly among the living creatures of the earth, the highest place is to be allowed to man. To go further than this appears to Lotze to be simply inquisitiveness. In the same way, a warning is given against pushing the theory of types too far. You can no more conclude from the ossification of the covering of the arteries that it is a softened bone, than you can conclude from the perfect flower that the stamens are modified leaves. The second chapter, which is on the propagation of forms of life, treats of the increase, propagation, and conservation of species; the third, on the relation between organisms and the external world, is occupied with individual existence, the influence of cosmical forces, the interchange of elements which goes on between the organism and the external world, and also with the relation of the individual life to the collective life of Nature.—Both in the *Pathology* and *Physiology* Lotze had frequently drawn attention to the fact that the animal and human organisms were intended by their nature to receive impulses from a soul which was bound up with them. These hints, which have been neglected particularly by those who have employed Lotze's writings in the interest of materialism, are supplemented by the detailed treatment of the subject given in the *Medical Psychology*, which is intended to be a physiology of the spiritual life, as distinguished from the physiology of the bodily life. Like all Lotze's writings, this work is divided into three books, of which the *first* discusses the general fundamental conceptions of physiological psychology. The first chapter treats of the existence of the soul, with constant critical reference to materialism, on the one side, and to the different systems of identity, on the other. In reference to the former, it is shown that the assumption of the existence of an immaterial soul is by no means to be identified with that of the existence of life-force—the reasons against the possibility of which are here collected together and put in a more succinct form than anywhere else

in Lotze's writings,—but that the fact of the unity of consciousness makes the assumption necessary, as affording the only grounds upon which it can be explained. To the systems of identity Lotze objects, that to unite in one substance an ideal and a real attribute, is simply to mock the desire for real unity. Spiritualism is brought forward in opposition to both, as being the true standpoint, looked at from which, what is for materialism the most solid and certain of all things, *viz.* matter, disappears. It is not matter which is given us in experience, but all sorts of attributes, which we may comprehend under the name materiality. With reference to a large portion of these attributes, namely, the qualitative, the physicists themselves confess that they are relations to us; as regards the others, extension, impenetrability, etc., it may be shown that they can very reasonably be explained as relations of simple, unextended existences. If we at the same time hold fast to the thought that our own inner states, our feelings, etc., are absolutely certain and immediately evident to us, and that it will be difficult to satisfy an ideal interest if by far the largest portion of all existences is regarded as being nothing for itself, but as being there solely for others, then the only tenable view appears to be that which takes up the position that only spiritual monads exist. If from the inner states of these monads we could now deduce the relations which furnish us with the phenomena of impenetrability, etc., then psychology would be the foundation of philosophy, or rather it would be the whole of philosophy. But this is not the case; and so we must take as our starting-point, and in the form of an abbreviation for what has not yet been deduced from principles, material existence, on the one hand, and our psychical existence, on the other, and take these along with each other; or, we must begin with making a sharp separation between body and soul. For this reason we would have to consider first, the joint physical and psychical mechanism, and this forms the subject of the second chapter. The main point to be noticed here is the view that the exercise of an influence by the soul on the body, and *vice versâ*, ought not to be really any more incomprehensible than that of one wheel of a machine upon the other; and, to be sure, not less so, for *how* motion is communicated, and *how* the separate parts of the wheel cohere, we also do not know. All that is given us by experience here, as well as in the other case, is that a process



in the one is conditioned by a process in the other. Lotze is accordingly willing to describe his standpoint as Occasionalism; but he gives us to understand that the spiritualistic view characterized above can supply us with a more thoroughgoing explanation, and do this more easily, than any other. Souls or spirits, immaterial or ideal substances, could exert an influence on what is material quite as readily as imponderables do upon ponderable matter, even if the elements of what is material had an essentially different nature; and naturally this influence could be much more easily explained, according to the theory referred to. After emphasizing the fact that the soul requires bodily affections in order that it may translate them into sensations, and then further modify them by its own action, Lotze explains in detail that the soul needs for one part of its work only the conductors or nerve fibres, for other parts whole organs, and for parts of it, again, which are different, neither of these. Finally, he designates that part of the brain which has no fibres as the probable seat of the soul, since the existence of a common point for all nerve fibres cannot be demonstrated, nor is it likely, indeed, that the separate excitations of the soul are conveyed to it in a condition of entire isolation. (The question how the soul nevertheless comes to have perceptions of space is specially treated of afterwards.) The third chapter takes up the consideration of the essence and destinies of the soul, and Lotze here carries the sphere of animated existence further down than Fechner, since he holds that the elements of what is material have also feeling. On the other hand, he rejects the idea that the celestial bodies have souls, criticizes the theories of Herbart and Hegel, defines his own standpoint as the idealistic, according to which everything exists only because it has its necessary place as expressing a morally valuable Idea that constitutes its essential nature. He accordingly claims immortality, not for all souls, because they are substances in Herbart's sense, but only for those which realize in themselves a nature of such high value, that owing to it they cannot be lost to the whole. That phase of the course of Nature during which the germ of a physical organism originates, represents also the moment in which the substantial ground of the world produces the soul. Just as the bodily excitation reacts on the soul, and is the occasion of its having a sensation, so here the act of production, which takes its rise in psychical impulses, supplies a like occa-

sion for God, in whom everything takes place. In the *second* book, which treats of the elements and physiological mechanism of the life of the soul, Lotze opposes Herbart's attack on the older theory of the three psychological faculties, without on that account bestowing praise on this theory. He shows how, besides the capacity possessed by the soul for producing sensations in answer to stimuli, and also presentations, we must suppose that it possesses a capacity, which is not deducible from the other, of having feelings of pleasure and disinclination, and thirdly, the capacity of effort. The simple sensations, the feelings, the psychological motions and impulses are treated of, and, finally, he passes on to discuss spatial perceptions. Among so many points that are interesting, the most interesting in connection with this subject is, that Lotze shows how, while to start with, it is only in an isolated condition that the impressions received are conducted to the brain, where at length they reach the fibreless parenchym of the brain within which the soul is found, it becomes possible for the soul by means of certain local signs which each impression has acquired in the course of its transit, to assign to their right place the objects which have caused the impression. He shows, too, how at the same time a great many advantages are thus attained, such as modification by distribution to other nerve fibres; and how it becomes possible to explain a large number of empirical facts, such as joint motions, etc. In the *third* book he discusses the life of the soul in its healthy and diseased conditions, and takes up, first, the states of consciousness; next, the conditions of the development of the life of the soul; and, finally, those things which disturb soul-life. Consciousness and unconsciousness, sleeping and waking, the course of ideas, self-consciousness, attention, moods and emotions, as well as their reaction on the processes of circulation, secretion, and nutrition, instincts and innate individual capacities, are, in addition to the pathological phenomena, the most outstanding subjects in this book.

13. The fact that Lotze also in this book lops off a number of investigations because they belong to a "philosophical" psychology, might almost have made any one who had an exalted idea of his importance as a philosopher, impatient with him for being so long in fulfilling the promise made at the end of the *Physiology*, that he would go into at least the "region which lies between æsthetics and physiology." He at last

redeemed his promise by presenting in his *Microcosmus* the "attempt to construct an anthropology, of which the aim is to investigate the whole significance of human existence by a joint consideration of individual life and of the history of the civilization of our race." In harmony with what had already been indicated in his earlier works, he here develops in detail the view that the opposition between the æsthetic-religious and the physical view of nature, rests on a misunderstanding, and vanishes when the physicist admits that the creation and origin of things form no part of his subject, but that he has to do simply with things as they stand in a reciprocal relation to each other as governed by law; and when the religious man on his part does not forget that it is not derogatory to the honour of the Creator, if He is related to created things as their Sustainer, *i.e.*, if He is related to them in such a way that He respects, or does not interfere with, the laws which govern their operation, and which He has given to them. That in the *First Volume*, the first book of which treats of the body, the second of the soul, and the third of life, a great deal of what was contained in the earlier works should be repeated, was to be expected. This repetition is seen in what is said as to the conflict between the various views of nature, as to mechanism in nature generally, and the mechanism of life in particular; next, in what is said regarding the structure of the animal body and its preservation, regarding the existence of the soul, its nature and its powers, the course of ideas, the forms of relative knowledge, the feelings, self-consciousness, and the will; and also in what relates to the connection between body and soul, the seat of the latter, the reciprocal action between both, the life of matter, and the beginning and end of the soul. But even one who has read these earlier works will not feel, when he takes up this book, that in any part it consists of pure repetition. In the *Second Volume*, the fourth book treats of man, the fifth of spirit, the sixth of the course of the world. The five chapters into which each of these three books is divided, develop a number of ideas in reference to subjects which are not to be met with at all in the earlier writings, or which are only very briefly indicated. A statement of the headings of these chapters will show the truth of this. Thus we have: Nature and the Ideas; Nature out of Chaos (in the chapter thus entitled, the question is started as to why it is that disorder

should necessarily come first); the Unity of Nature; Man and the Animals; the Diversity of the Human Species, *i.e.*, Races; Spirit and Soul; The Human Faculties of Sense; Language and Thought; Knowledge and Truth; Conscience and Morality; The Influences of External Nature; Human Nature; Manners and Customs; The Various Parts of the Outer Life; The Inner Life. No reader will be deceived if he expects to find here a very rich store of instruction. He must, however, make up his mind to find much which appeared to him indisputable truth described as uncertain, and in the same way much which he held to be demonstrably false represented as at least probable. It is this last-mentioned fact which has especially brought the materialists, who had got accustomed to count Lotze as one of themselves, to brand him as an "apostate." The *Third Volume* is also divided into fifteen chapters, each five of which make up one book. The seventh treats of history, the eighth of progress, and the ninth of the connection of things. In no part of the work is there so much to be found that is new as in this. Quite at the beginning,—where he discusses the creation of man, and in connection with this the constancy of natural development, and the acts of free interference with nature on the part of God,—Lotze holds up a mirror in which both the so-called believers with their childish fear, and those who, in their arrogance, take weak hypotheses for absolutely certain knowledge, may see themselves and learn something. A further point of the greatest interest is Lotze's nominalistic view, particularly if we compare it with the opposite view of Fechner. It comes into prominence where he speaks of the education and progress of humanity. Since humanity is an unreal abstraction, those expressions have a meaning only on the supposition that the single individuals continue to exist, and attain a consciousness of how they have helped on the coming generations. Freedom and necessity are discussed in connection with the forces which operate in history; and attention is directed to the hollowness of the conclusions which are drawn from statistical observations. The external conditions of development are taken up, and at the same time the question as to the unity of the origin of humanity is considered. All this is done with that same feeling for truth which Lotze has displayed from the first, and which prevents him from forming hasty judgments. The seventh book closes with a thoughtful

survey of the history of the world, which helps us to understand why Lotze speaks with such reverence of Herder, and to which he attaches a warning against writing any philosophy of history until the facts have been more thoroughly investigated, particularly those referring to Orientalism. The eighth book opens with a survey of the course which has been followed by Science. The conclusion he comes to is, that the errors of modern idealism,—namely, that thought and being are identical, and that the essence of things is thought,—have been inherited from the philosophers of antiquity, who in their identification of logic and metaphysics put the Logos above everything else, and in doing this forgot that which goes beyond all reason, and which therefore must be grasped and experienced with the entire spirit. The enjoyment of life, and work, are described both on their light and dark sides, and in their various stages, until the modern stage is reached in which all interests are swallowed up in “business,” which has taken the place of work. He then passes on to speak of the Beautiful and Art, and gives an historical survey of æsthetic ideas. Of these, that of the colossal is allotted to the East, that of sublimity to the Hebrews, that of beauty to the Greeks, the ideas of elegance and dignity to Romans, the characteristic and fantastic to the Middle Ages, and the brilliant and critical to modern times. In the account of the religious life which follows, Lotze states that the cosmological element is predominant in Paganism, and the moral element in Judaism and Christianity, while he finds in the more modern philosophical dogmatics a return to the ascendancy of cosmology. The fact that the East is the cradle of religion, is to be explained by the circumstance that there men’s thoughts are always directed to the whole; while in the West, on the contrary, attention is bestowed on the universal. The last chapter is occupied with showing the progress which has been made in public life and society. Family and patriarchal States, the kingdoms of the East, despotism as political tutelage, the political work of Art of the Greeks, the civic commonwealth and law in Rome, the autonomy of society, rational and historical law, are discussed here; and the book ends with a statement of the postulates which can be realized, and those which cannot. Lotze takes up a position of decided antagonism to the deification of the State, a manifestation of which he sees in the fact that the State is conceived of as an end in

itself ; but he takes up the same position, too, in reference to the revolutionary disregard of existing rights. In the last book of the whole work he treats of the connection of things, and by gathering together all the threads of the thoughts which have been so far developed, he is able to point out the foundation upon which all the investigations have rested. What is here stated has naturally many points of contact with what was said in the *Metaphysics*. In the first chapter the being of things is treated of ; and it is shown that there is no other kind of being than that which consists of "standing in relation," and therefore that a form of existence which is absolutely without relation involves a contradiction. It is further pointed out that the relation of two existences is not a relation between them, but a relation actually within them, since they are reciprocally related ; and it is shown, finally, that this reciprocity is possible only through a substantial unity which exists in the individual things in such a way that their inter-actions are the states of an existing thing. In the second chapter, which treats of the world in space and the world beyond sense, the theory of space, as being the form, not of perception, but of perceptions, and which had already been developed in the *Metaphysics*, is fully worked out and compared with the theories of Kant and Herbart. It is also shown, how the place of the thing in our perception corresponds to its position in the intellectual order, and how its motion in space which we perceive, corresponds to the alteration it undergoes. It is thus under the form of space that relations appear to us ; and since being consists of these, it is also under this form that being appears to us. In the third chapter, which is entitled "The Real and Spirit," the truth of the spiritualism previously referred to is established by showing that reciprocal action, or rather, reciprocal passion, is possible only in the case of beings which take note of this interaction, or feel it, or in the case of beings which exist for themselves ; and that thus it is only beings which exist for themselves, or spirits, which can be real. This is followed, in the fourth chapter, by a discussion of the personality of God. The relation between faith and knowledge is here considered, the arguments for the being of God criticized, Fichte's objections to the personality of God closely examined, his conception of God and the pantheistic conception criticized ; and it is shown that selfhood, or being-for-itself in general,

does not postulate a non-ego as standing over against it, but that it does this only when it appears as conditioned. The concluding chapter treats of God and the world, and takes up the origin of eternal truths and their relation to God, creation, preservation, the origin of reality and evil, the Good, forms of goodness and love, and, finally, the unity of the three principles in love. The modest caution which in general is characteristic of Lotze, comes out particularly at the close, where he foreshadows as the goal of knowledge—a goal which he thinks it will be difficult to reach—a standpoint from which it might be possible to find a solution of the three questions, Wherefore? By what means? For what end? by answering the last, and from which the laws according to which things exist, the forces by means of which they exist, and the ends for the sake of which they exist, could be all known at once, or, what comes to the same thing, a standpoint from which it could be seen that in mathematical and mechanical knowledge, ethical demands are at the same time satisfied. The substance of his views is contained in the concluding remarks, in which the universal is described as being everywhere of less value as contrasted with the particular, and the species as compared with the individual; and in which the living personal Spirit of God, and the world of personal spirits which He has created, are described as representing true reality. Any one who has read Lotze's *Microcosmus* with attention will hold that he is too modest in what he says about it in the introduction to the ninth book, and will, in spite of his polemic against the notion that every one should have his place allotted to him in the history of the development of philosophy, assign him a place in it, and certainly none of the lowest. The fact that our exposition ends with him shows how high we rank him.

14. In his *History of Æsthetics in Germany* (Munich, 1868), Lotze appeared for the first time in the historical sphere. Instead of making, as has been done, loud complaint, that in Lotze's case the philosophical writer on æsthetics has spoiled the historian, we have here to record our gratitude that this book is a compensation for the many in our day which promise to supply us with philosophy and actually give history. By giving a clear paraphrase of the thoughts expressed in the theories which he describes, instead of simply reproducing them, he has rendered even the mere comprehension of them much

easier than if he had given careful excerpts. It was, of course, far more necessary when it came to be a matter of distinguishing what is permanent from what is transitory, that the narrator should make way for the critic. This work is also divided into three books, the *first* of which gives an account of the *History of General Standpoints* (pp. 1-246). Although the period which is covered by the names of Baumgarten, Winkelman and Lessing could supply in the labours of the first of these, nothing beyond a systematic basis for the discussion of the entire subject, and by means of what was done by the other two, only an awakening of criticism, and the feeling for Art, still the fact that questions which had hitherto been kept apart were united together under the one heading of æsthetics was a circumstance of no small importance; and, indeed, it has come to be of particular importance that Baumgarten should have held to the doctrine of the best possible world. The science which he created has inherited from him a means of protection against that discontent which leads men to despise the world, and also an aversion to all that is heterocosmical. It is true, that he also left as a legacy to those who came after him the kind of feeling which led them for a long time to treat the taking of delight in the beautiful as a weakness which stood in need of being defended. Kant, even, is by no means free from this feeling, though he certainly laid the foundation of scientific æsthetics. We must recognise it as his greatest merit, that he laid such stress upon the thought of the Beautiful as existing only for us, and so strongly emphasized the subjectivity of æsthetic judgments, although the knowledge which supplies the complement of this escaped him, namely, that the perceiving subject is equally a part of the world, and that its conception of reality, or the phenomenal, is the most essential part of what exists under the name of the "course of the world." However deplorable in many respects is Herder's attack on Kant, which is taken up in the third chapter, still the stress he laid upon the significance of the Beautiful directed attention to a very important point. All that is beautiful is really in so far a symbol as it (for instance, in symmetry, balance, harmony) has an analogy with some good which is attainable by us. Schiller's attempt to reconcile beauty and morality, which is discussed in the fourth chapter, gives evidence of a conflict in his mind between the theory of Kant, which he had formerly adopted, and a preference for his "ad-



hering beauty ;” and we see that in this conflict Schiller is constantly on the point of breaking the fetters of the system. The fifth chapter treats of the enormous advance which was made in æsthetics owing to the influence of Schelling’s idealism. It consists in the fact that Schelling conceived of the world as a *beautiful* Whole, in which the enjoyment of the Beautiful is an essential and necessary process. The very same defect in Schelling’s system, which brings him into variance with the natural sciences, is fatal also for æsthetics, and this in spite of all the distinction he has won for himself in connection with the latter. This defect consists in the fact that he refuses to recognise the distinction between ideas and appearance. The former represent what has moral worth, things that have to be done, things that *ought* to be, while in the latter mechanism holds sway, *i.e.*, rigid causal connection, or necessity. Schelling, instead of conceding the truth there is in the latter, claims to have demonstrated the existence of the necessary by presenting to us what involves the idea of what *ought* to be ; and thus, out of ideas which can work actively within their own sphere, he made ideas to conjure with, and turned science into his enemy. But besides, it now became impossible for him to realize the æsthetic truth, that the beatific feeling of surprise which we have at the sight of the Beautiful in nature, is based on the fact that something which ought to be or has moral worth, has come to exist under the wholly different conditions of what is governed by necessity. The fact that the manifold which presents itself to perception, has play in these ideal forms, although it is not bound by any moral obligation to appear in them, fills us with a feeling of reverential delight occasioned by the aspect of a world in which the eternal laws of what ought to be, take on the outward form of flesh and blood. We can moreover recognise in Schelling’s beautiful world, Baumgarten’s aversion to the heterocosmical. In the following chapter, the attempts of Solger and Schleiermacher to represent Fancy as the creator of the Beautiful are criticized, the latter very severely. Krause and Schopenhauer are only briefly mentioned. Since the difference between Schelling and Hegel is held by Lotze to consist simply in the dialectic method employed by the latter, this is examined in detail in the seventh chapter ; and its cardinal error is held to consist in the fact that it asserts of conceptions what is true only of things. But it is admitted at the

same time, that the influence which this method has exercised for such a long time on men's minds, becomes intelligible when its genesis is more carefully inquired into. This is done in a very delightful way in the same chapter in which Lotze comes to the conclusion respecting Hegel's *Æsthetics*, that although the gain is small as regards the most general questions, all the more inexhaustible is the wealth of stimulating and delicate thoughts which Hegel here presents us with, in connection with the arts and works of art. With Hegel, he connects Weisse and Vischer, in the following chapter. A warm eulogium is pronounced upon Weisse, and it is recognised that he has done the most perfect work in the direction of the idealistic treatment of the subject. His divergence from Hegel is based on the fact, that while Hegel's Absolute Spirit exists only in so far as it has intercourse with finite spirits, Weisse sought from the beginning to find in the person of the living God the termination and conclusion of all his thoughts. Weisse's work in this department is marred only by one thing, namely, by his being wedded to the dialectic method; and the same is true of Vischer. In the case of the latter, we have also to lament the conflict he carries on with all forms of theism, which is entirely a barren one, so far as æsthetics is concerned. The fundamental definition of the Beautiful is borrowed from Vischer, and then in the last chapter he passes on to Herbart. He admits that it is part of the work of æsthetics to discover those ultimate relations which are the cause of our pleasure in the Beautiful; but, on the other hand, he finds fault with Herbart for attacking idealism, which seeks to get at the definite meaning of the Beautiful, and also with his purely formal conception of Beauty; and Zimmerman is very often adversely criticized by Lotze for maintaining the correctness of this conception of Herbart's. He still further finds fault with the philosophy of Herbart for taking its stand on the fact that certain relations are productive of pleasure, as if this were an ultimate principle; and finally, he complains that in Herbart's philosophy sufficient stress is not laid on the importance of feeling in connection with the estimate formed of the Beautiful. The *Second Book* (pp. 249-438) contains the *History of the Separate Fundamental Æsthetic Conceptions*. After having, to begin with, called attention to the error which has been fallen into, of denying that there are any distinctions of degree in the Beautiful, an

error which has arisen particularly owing to the neglect of the element of feeling, and in consequence of which a great deal that certainly occupies a subordinate place in the Beautiful, but is yet akin to it, has been excluded from it, he treats first of all of the agreeable in sensation, as an element which operates in connection with æsthetic judgments. He shows here that neither the physiological explanation,—and not even that of Helmholtz,—nor the purely psychological explanation given by Herbart, is sufficient to solve the problem as to why certain relations of tone and colour are felt to be beautiful, *i.e.*, are felt to be symbols of what has moral value. The element which gives rise to an agreeable feeling in connection with perception, is discussed in the second chapter; and in this connection he treats especially of rhythm and symmetry, which also produce pleasure only by means of the feeling of moral value which they cause in us—*i.e.*, because they give us an experience of something which is analogous to those tasks set before us in ethics. The beauty of reflection is treated of in the fourth chapter, in which he discusses the sublime, the ugly, and the ridiculous. The various theories which have been propounded are criticized and improved, and finally in a half-earnest, half-humorous way, he proposes to adopt a modification of the dialectic arrangement given by Weisse and Vischer. In the following chapter, he discusses the æsthetic moods of Fancy. Just as, in constructing a theoretic science of the world, the method of investigation adopted by one may be mechanical, and by another morphological or teleological, so the conception formed of the world by fancy may be sentimental or naïve, ironical or humorous. These conceptions are discussed in this order, with reference to the utterances of Schiller, the Romanticists, Solger, Hegel, and others; and in particular, Lotze frees humour from the mephistophelian character which is ascribed to it by most writers on æsthetics. In the sixth chapter, he treats of æsthetic ideals, and declares that he essentially agrees with Weisse in holding that we must here distinguish between three æsthetic theories of the universe, the classical, romantic, and modern, which have derived their importance, not from individuals, but from races. Lotze also expresses agreement with Weisse, in holding that beauty as understood in modern times is characterized by purity (*i.e.*, it is not mixed up with the religious and the moral, etc.), and by universality; only he seeks to find a basis for these character-

istics by calling attention to the fact that the recognition of the place of mechanism is one of the most pregnant traits of the modern conception of the world. Under the heading "Artistic Activities," he mentions and criticizes the views of Kant, Fries, Schelling, Weisse, Schleiermacher, H. Ritter, and others, on talent, taste, and genius. The *Third Book* (pp. 491-672) is called *Aids to the History of Theories of Art*, because its aim is simply to make a contribution to the subject. In it he shows how the system of the arts is to be constructed according to Schelling, Solger, Hegel, Weisse, Zimmermann, Knosen, Zeising; and how he himself would construct it, as best suited to his own views. According to this, music comes first as the art of free beauty, which is conditioned only by the laws of its materials, and not by any definite end, or by anything which it has to imitate. The great work done by Helmholtz in connection with the subject is treated of in detail, Hanslick's somewhat paradoxical statements with regard to the relation between music and the feelings are criticized in connection with the views of older theorists; the peculiar relationship between music in particular and what has been called after Weisse the modern ideal, is emphasized; and Lotze then passes from a consideration of Weisse's division of musical works to speak of R. Wagner's position in reference to instrumental music; and finally, he points out the dangers with which the German predilection for music is attended. In connection with architecture, stress is laid, in the third chapter, on the following point as one that is essential: that a multiplicity of heavy material elements be held together by the force of a single principle, so as to form a permanent equilibrium on a supporting ground. He next joins issue in a very decided way with the genteel habit of despising the useful, which is not to be confounded with what can simply be used. Finally, while making some critical remarks on the views of Schnaase, K. Bötticher, Forchhammer, Hübsch, Semper, and others, he gives in this chapter a warning against the one-sidedness involved in rejecting a style of architecture which is historically warranted. In the following chapter, on the plastic arts, he first states the views of Winckelmann and Lessing, and then allows anatomy to give its vote in connection with the Laocoon question. A. von Feuerbach, and Schelling's well-known address, lead to the subject of the more favourable position which was granted to the plastic artist in an-

tiquity. The chapter concludes with the expressed wish, that, instead of erecting statues of the poets, we might set up plastic representations of their creations, which contain that modern mythology for which Schelling longed. In treating of painting, Lotze first contrasts the art of painting with the architectonic and plastic arts by showing that it has to do with "the historical element in things and persons," and from this he deduces those characteristics which other writers on æsthetics have laid down as being fundamental, as, for instance, the connection with the background, colour,—which was employed by the plastic arts also in antiquity,—light-effects, etc. He then examines the connection between painting and poetry, discusses the question of imitation and idealizing, style and manner, and finally treats of the classification of paintings into historical (sacred) pictures, genre pictures,—including in these pictures of incident, which form the culminating point of this class,—and landscape pictures. In the last chapter, on the art of poetry, Lotze hurries almost too much. In treating of the epic, he takes W. von Humboldt's celebrated criticism of *Hermann and Dorothea* as his starting-point, though he does this only to find that it gives "correct descriptions, but insufficient explanations." The writers on æsthetics who follow Humboldt have, Lotze thinks, directed their attention too exclusively to the Homeric epic, while seeking to characterize the epic in general, and accordingly think only of epics with finished characters. Hence their inability to appreciate the novel properly, which presents to us a picture of the gradual growth of natures capable of development, and in circumstances which are already complete in themselves. Those who take offence at the prose of novels, forget that beautiful prose,—and, indeed, who writes it now?—is also artistic, *i.e.*, beautiful, language. In discussing the lyric, he takes as his starting-point what Goethe said as to the origin of his poems, and what Schiller said by way of criticism on Bürger. This was something quite different from Humboldt's criticism above referred to; for Lotze finds that we have simply to comment on what they have said, exactly as, from the fact of the existence of lyrics by Goethe and Schiller, we can deduce the justification of direct and reflective poetry. Weisse's demand, that in the lyric, not only the subject, but the subject *as* poet, should be put into the foreground, is explained from his (legitimate) preference for Rückert, and estimated accordingly. Nowhere has

the reader so strong a feeling that Lotze is hastening to the end as in what he says of dramatic poetry. It is only since Schelling, he thinks, that it has become possible to form a right estimate of tragic poetry. The characterization of the general conception of this part of poetry was begun by A. von Schlegel, and was completed by Vischer. In the appreciation of Shakespeare, "German æsthetics has spoken through Gervinus its last word."

15. A wish which had been long entertained by Lotze's many admirers,—or rather, not so much simply a wish as a justifiable expectation,—was fulfilled when he gave to the world his *System of Philosophy* (Leipsic, 1874), *i.e.*, as he modestly says in the preface, the sum of his personal convictions in a systematic form. Unfortunately, only the first part of it has as yet appeared—the three books of the Logic, which treat of thought, investigation, and knowledge, or of pure, applied, and methodological logic. The *first* book (pp. 1–185) serves at the same time as an improved edition of his little *Logic* published in 1843, and which has long been out of print. Starting from the distinction between the cases where, in the process through which our ideas go, two ideas simply encounter each other, and those in which they have an affinity with each other (partly because the causes which produce them are always united), Lotze vindicates for thought the capability of adding to the first ideas by the aid of certain subsidiary thoughts the title to affinity. The forms which thought employs for this purpose are treated of in systematic connection, when it is proved that there exists in them an increasing series in which each member that appears later seeks to do away with the defect of the one before it, which is that the need of proving the existence of the affinity has not yet been satisfied. We must not, therefore, as is now often proposed, begin with judgment but with conception, which is distinguished from general presentation, in that it not only attaches the indefinite subsidiary thought of totality to the qualities, but the definite ground or reason of their union. A careful consideration of conception gives Lotze the chance of expressing his views on universal and particular conceptions, on extension and content, abstraction and determination; and the result arrived at is, that the formation of the conception is a process the justification of which is proved by the doctrine of the judgment, to which

for this reason he now passes. In this, the main point is, that the different forms of judgment depend on the different significations of the copula, *i.e.*, on the different subsidiary thoughts which we construct for ourselves with regard to the union of subject and predicate. Since then, as Lotze attempts to show, the differences of quantity, quality, and modality do not in any way alter the relation of the two constituent parts of the judgment, it is only necessary to examine those of relation; and this is done by discussing along with the categorical judgment, the *principium identitatis*, along with the hypothetical judgment, the *principium rationis sufficientis*, and along with the disjunctive judgment the *dictum de omni*, and the *principium exclusi medii*. All the forms of connection here discussed are logical and not psychological, since the question is as to the relation between the contents of two ideas, and not as to any relation existing between the ideas. We are bound, therefore, to regard them as objective, *i.e.*, as valid for every conscious being. But though we can thus prove that objectivity belongs to them, this does not decide anything whatever as to their real or metaphysical significance, *i.e.*, as to whether we have the same or an analogous connection between things outside of consciousness corresponding to the connection between these forms. The unsolved problem, which is indicated in the disjunctive judgment, forces us to go further, namely, to the syllogism. Just as, in passing to the judgment, it was seen that its first form, the impersonal judgment, contains scarcely anything more than the conception, so too something similar is seen in connection with the first form of the syllogism, the syllogism of subsumption of the first figure, which is simply an explication of the disjunctive judgment. The syllogisms of induction and analogy, which correspond to the second and third figures, go in many respects beyond it. This is still more the case with the mathematical inferences which we meet with in the syllogisms of substitution and proportion, as also in the syllogism formed by constitutive comparisons. In thus putting such a high value upon the various syllogisms it is not meant that, like Aristotle, we should abide by only the one point of view, and think only of what service these syllogisms are in the process of proof, but that we should ask, what increase of fresh knowledge do they secure for us? This is done by the systematic forms which enable us to put

different things side by side, and which are applied both in artistic and natural classification, and done by these to a much greater extent than by syllogistic reasonings and mathematical inferences. It is also done when we apply a theory to explain something, and finally when we see living development in the sum of the elements of which the world is composed. With this form of thought, which makes thought speculative, we also reach the stage which points beyond the sphere of logic. Speculation, by seeking to find a basis for the direction taken by the development of the world "in the nature of what constitutes a supreme principle, indicates by this that the final completion of all logical effort to reach truth is made possible, not by means of new logical forms, but only by means of the actual knowledge of what it assumes as the supreme self-developing principle." The *second* book (pp. 187-462) treats of investigation, or contains the applied logic. That is to say, it supplies us with directions as to how to deal with the hindrances which arise from the fact that the special peculiarities of various subjects render it more or less difficult to arrange them under the logical forms. In harmony with what Lotze had said in the year 1843, when he was dealing only with pure logic, he here infers from the task which belongs to applied logic, that rigid systematic treatment of the subject must here be sacrificed; and that, on the ground of utility, we must choose, from among the various methods by which it has been contrived to get over that difficulty, that method which science, so far as it has gone, has taught us to recognise as having weight and as being productive of results. "The limitlessness of the materials which have come under scientific observation renders it unfortunately impossible to set forth with that completeness which is in itself desirable, this the most brilliant part of logic, which has to do with the inventive power that distinguishes modern times." In accordance with what is here said, the ten chapters into which this, the most difficult part of Lotze's book, is divided, contain some very instructive separate discussions of points which however might well have been arranged in a different order. They have to do with definition, the limitation of conceptions, the schematic arrangement and connection of conceptions (here, among other things, there are criticisms of the ancient and modern philosophies of nature, and of the Hegelian dialectic), the forms of



proof, the discovery of the grounds of proof, with special reference to mechanics, errors in proof and dilemmas, universal propositions gathered from perceptions, discovery of laws (law, rule, hypothesis, etc.), characterization of singular facts, (probability and the estimate of its value), methods of the smallest squares, election and votes. The *third* book (pp. 463-597) treats of knowledge. (The attempt to justify the title, Methodology, will convince few that the operations discussed in the second book are not methods, and that what is treated of in the third book can rightly be described as method.) In this third part, Lotze takes up the question as to how far a whole composed of thoughts, which by means of all the help got from pure and applied logic we were enabled to construct, can lay claim to be a knowledge which answers to what we are forced to believe and assume to be the object and occasioning cause of our ideas. We now here first see that when scepticism, which is considered in the first chapter, holds it to be possible that things in themselves may be wholly different from what they are as we are compelled to think of them, it ends in pure absurdities, and reaches a knowledge which is not a knowledge of things but simply a knowledge that things are, etc.; and that a theory of knowledge should not seek to play the part of metaphysics, but must content itself with gaining established points of certainty within the world of presentation. Such points Plato rightly saw in the world of Ideas (ch. 2), *i.e.*, in those predicates of things which in their essence have an eternal validity independent of actual existence—a validity such as we attribute to the laws of nature. (The fact that Plato gave to these eternal truths the form of conception, instead of that of judgment, reminds us of the circumstance that Kant sets up categories from which he deduces the fundamental principles of the pure understanding; and perhaps it is based on the same reason.) In the third chapter, entitled “Apriorism and Empiricism,” Lotze brings forward, in opposition to the separation made between the receptivity and the spontaneity of the mind, which has been pushed too far, a proof of the fact that even sensations, are a joint product of the individual activity, while on the other hand, a great deal of what appears to us as a necessity of thought is mixed with purely empirical elements, and calls for a criticism of mental prepossessions. But we are still further warned against con-

founding the ascertained genesis of things with what they are when conceived of in thought, and against expecting in any way that the significance of logical forms will be discovered by observing how ideas are in the habit of uniting together in us, or when the bodily processes which occasion them become known to us. In the *fourth* chapter (The Real and Formal Significance of the Logical) Lotze distinguishes between the three contrasts implied in the terms, subjective and objective, formal and actual, formal and real, and once more goes over the forms which were examined in the pure logic; and for the most part refers to metaphysics the final decision of their nature. In the *fifth* and last chapter (The *a priori* Truths), he attacks the positions of empiricism, particularly in its English form, according to which it is held that mathematical knowledge rests simply on the principle of identity, that experience contains simply synthetic judgments *a posteriori*, and finally, that every truth, in order to be universally valid, requires to be tested by experience. Lotze holds, on the contrary, that we have an immediate certainty regarding what is universally valid, and upon which all conviction rests—a certainty which, call it intuition, or give it some other name, must be admitted to exist, although its origin is unexplained and will likely remain so. Such a certainty is the sure fact that all that happens happens in accordance with law; and there are synthetic truths which have this note of certainty, and which Hegel in his dialectic, certainly, and perhaps Plato too before him, have attempted to deduce from one supreme principle. “In the face of the universal deification which is bestowed at the present time on experience, and all the more cheaply and confidently the less chance there is of finding any one who does *not* understand its importance and indispensableness—in face of this fact, I at all events desire to close with the confession, that I consider that very form of speculative intuition, which is so much despised, as the supreme and not simply as the unattainable end of science; and also by expressing a hope that German philosophy will continue, with more moderation and self-restraint but with equal enthusiasm, to address itself anew to the attempt to *understand* the course of the world, and not merely to *describe* it.” Thus ends the work of a man who has no need to fear the reproach, that he speaks of what philosophy is and may accomplish, as a blind man speaks

of colour.—[In the spring of 1881, Lotze yielded to a second urgent call to the University of Berlin, but died there after an activity of only a few weeks, on July 1st. His most important work not mentioned here, was the Second Part of the *System of Philosophy*, the *Three Books of Metaphysic*, which appeared in 1878. The Third Part, which was to have treated of Ethics, Æsthetics and Philosophy of Religion, was never completed. The only portion of it found in condition for publication appeared in *Nord und Süd*, for June, 1882, as *The Principles of Ethics*. A second edition of the First Part of the *System* was issued in 1880. An English translation of the Logic and Metaphysic, edited by B. Bosanquet, was published at the Clarendon Press in 1884 (2 vols.); 2nd eds. Metaphysics (2 vols.), 1887, Logic (2 vols.), 1888. See also Lotze's Outlines of Philosophy in six parts, ed. Ladd (Boston, 1884-87); Outlines of Philosophy of Religion, tr. Brastow & Ladd (London, 1887); Microcosmus, tr. Hamilton & Jones (Edinburgh, 1888).—Ed.].

#### D.—FOURTH GROUP. CONCLUSION

##### § 348.

I. The works which have been partly mentioned and partly summarized in the last four sections, afford a proof that alongside of the process of the breaking up of the Hegelian school, philosophical works did not fail to appear in Germany, which either had no share in that process, or shared in it only in so far as it prepared the soil upon which they grew up. They prove, however, at the same time, that the complaint which meets us in almost all of them, that there is no longer any interest taken in philosophy, points to a fact which cannot be explained by saying that too few philosophical systems have been offered to the public. On the contrary, the numbers in which, and the rapidity with which, they have followed and are still following each other, leave even to the professional philosopher only the alternative of glancing through works which are the result of severe toil, or of entirely ignoring men who have bestowed a great deal of labour on their works. This same circumstance renders it impossible for the youth of our quick-living time to supply a contingent of pupils even to men like Weisse and Lotze, and perhaps explains how at the present day the majority of people regard our pursuit of

speculation very much as Savigny, when he published his epoch-making work, regarded the activity shown in his day in connection with the construction of systems of law. But just as he did not conclude from this that people should not trouble themselves about law at all, but that, instead of occupying themselves with vain attempts at constructing a system of law, men should occupy themselves with the fact that law had come to have its actually existing forms; so too in the department of philosophy, those who feel at the present time very much as he felt then,—at least those who are qualified to speak on the subject,—have directed their attention to the history of philosophy, and have entirely given themselves up to the study of it. The undeniable fact that, where there is still an interest felt in philosophical study, it does not consist in the impulse to engage in speculation for its own sake, but in the desire to see how others have speculated, is the counterpart of a phenomenon which also belongs to the present day, namely, that literary historians have taken the place of poets, and biographies have taken the place of great men. It is, in short, a proof that the system which taught us to paint grey in grey, and with which the history of philosophy became for the first time an integral part of the system of philosophy,—namely, the Hegelian system,—has not vanished without leaving a trace. And it is just on account of its historical element, that a well-informed opponent remarked years ago, that it was exactly the right philosophy for the historical school of law.

2. How very much the philosophical interest has fallen into the background in comparison with the historical, is proved above all by the fact that so many of a philosophical turn have gained a reputation exclusively in connection with this department. There is the less necessity for referring to their names and works, as they have been mentioned partly in § 13, and partly in their proper places in the present work. Many of these writers, besides their historical works on philosophy, have published purely philosophical works; but the latter have either been almost entirely ignored in favour of the others, as has been the case with the elder Sigwart and Zeller, or have been given a far inferior place in comparison with the historical works, a fact which no one will deny so far as Ritter and Prantl are concerned. The very same must be said of Kuno Fischer, who, though lauded as an historian of

philosophy, is undervalued as a philosopher; and what is more, in cases in which a writer valued the works on the history of philosophy which he undertook at a lower rate than his peculiarly philosophical works, the reading public has judged differently. Ernst Reinhold, Michelet, Chalybäus, are known as historians of philosophy in a much wider circle than as independent philosophers; and it must be said even of Trendelenburg, that his *History of the Doctrine of the Categories*, and some historical and critical articles, are far more read than his *Logical Investigations*, not to mention the favourable way in which the two former were received. The same statement might be repeated word for word in reference to Braniss. In fact, this preponderance of the historical element is manifest even in the speculations themselves. What a large space is occupied in philosophical works by the critical discussions, and particularly by the historical introductions! If we except the works of Weisse and Lotze,—which in this point also are distinguished from the others,—it may be stated as the rule, that if we leave out these discussions and introductions, the works might be compressed into one half their present size. They might often be put into still smaller bulk, for Wirth's *Idea of the Godhead*, Hillebrandt's *Organism of the Philosophical Idea*, are almost nothing more than a sketch of the history of philosophy. And just as the authors seem to pass unwillingly from the historical part to the peculiarly philosophical part, so this disinclination seems to be met by a perfectly similar disinclination on the part of the readers. Many of those philosophers do not know that there are libraries in which the critical and historical part of their works is quite thumbed, while the speculative part is not cut; and most of them must be prepared to find that the historical portion is read with interest, and that therefore what is said in it is retained in the memory, while the speculative part is read simply from a feeling of duty, and thus is without any lasting influence. It is to this circumstance, and not, as the evil-disposed assert, to the *associations d'admiration mutuelle*, that we may attribute the fact that men whose standpoints are very different, yet praise each other's books, and agree with the views expressed in them. These agreements have reference to the critical and historical investigations, while the thetic or positive investigations are ignored. When one hears Ulrici speak of Chaly-

bäus and Trendelenburg as if his views were entirely in accord with theirs, we must not think in this instance of the soul-ether of the former, nor of the doctrine of matter held by the latter, but of the wrath of both against the Hegelians, and of the thorough examination by Trendelenburg of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories. In the same way, Ulrici has received many compliments for his criticism of the Hegelian philosophy; but, so far as regards his theory of distinguishing activity, he stands pretty much alone. And so a large number of cases might be cited which would afford a proof that the historical point of view has driven the philosophical into the background.

3. There may be some who are glad of this, just as there are some who see in the history of literature a compensation for the poetical works which no longer appear, or who even, because they have written the biography of a great man, see one in themselves. Those who are favourably disposed towards philosophy will hardly think after this fashion; and many have stated it as their opinion,—and this was done in France still earlier than in Germany,—that all this is really a symptom of philosophical decrepitude. Still, a consideration in which there is some consolation may be connected with this fact. We were reminded above of Savigny's celebrated work. Since the appearance of it and of Savigny's historical writings, a new impetus has been given, not only to the study of the history of law, but also to that of law itself. And why? Because the study of the history of law was prosecuted by him in the spirit of a true jurist. So, too, the predominating interest taken in the history of philosophy may yet be made use of in the interests of philosophy, if readers, by having its history presented to them in a philosophical way, are led to think in a philosophical way about it along with the author. What we speculate about is at bottom a matter of indifference; and therefore at every period philosophy has taken for its object just what was of most interest for the time—as, for instance, nature, the State, dogma, etc. Why then should it not now take up the history of philosophy? It has been already remarked at the close of § 13, that now it is the custom to treat the history of philosophy only in a philosophical way. Against the complaint, therefore, that there is no longer any philosophical speculation, but that it is only the study of the history of philosophy which is cultivated, and that philosophers

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have turned into historians, we may put the certain fact that the historians of philosophy are themselves in the habit of engaging in philosophical speculation; and so perhaps here too, the same lance which gave the wound will heal it.





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